Here, from Roy K Altman at The Free Press, is a good article on the International Court of Justice’s decision on Myanmar’s supposed ‘genocide’ of the Rohinga. How the Campaign Against Israel Rewrote the Law of Genocide.
Yesterday’s long-awaited ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)—finding Myanmar guilty of genocide in a case brought by the Republic of The Gambia—may have imperiled the court’s own legitimacy. Along the way, the ICJ—the branch of the United Nations’ judicial system that adjudicates disputes between states—has violated some foundational precepts of our Western tradition in ways that may expose any government, including our own, to arbitrary genocide prosecutions in the future.
The ICJ’s finding was long awaited not because anyone had shown much interest over the last 10 years in Myanmar’s brutal campaign against its minority Muslim population, known as the Rohingya, in a war that started in 2016. The outsize attention has had little to do with either Myanmar or The Gambia and a great deal to do with the watered-down definition of genocide the court was being asked to adopt. If you guessed that this may have something to do with the international community’s obsession with the world’s only Jewish state, you’d be right.
Before we get to that, though, some context: The Rohingya are an ethnic group who live in the northern Rakhine State of Myanmar. In 2016, an armed Rohingya insurgent group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), carried out a terrorist attack in Myanmar. In response, Myanmar began “clearance operations” against the Rohingya, murdering approximately 10,000 civilians, burning whole villages, and pushing almost all the Rohingya (some 815,000 people) across the border into Bangladesh.
Myanmar, for its part, suggested that the court might reasonably infer from the evidence that it committed the crime of ethnic cleansing—the act of forcibly deporting the Rohingya back across the border to Bangladesh. But it denied that the evidence supported the genocide accusation. This distinction the law draws between the kinds of proof that are required to prove ethnic cleansing on the one hand and genocide on the other may seem surprising to lay observers, but it makes sense in the context of international law. Genocide, after all, is a unique crime—the ultimate crime of crimes—and it accordingly requires a heightened level of proof and a special kind of intent.
As to intent, the UN’s Genocide Convention requires proof that the accused had the “specific intent” to “destroy” the victimized group “in whole or in part.” On burden, the ICJ has said that proof of genocidal intent can either be explicit—as, for instance, in the Holocaust, where the order to exterminate Europe’s Jews was issued expressly by high-ranking Nazis at the Wannsee Conference—or it can be inferred. But the circumstances in which the court will infer genocidal intent, the ICJ has made clear, are very narrow: Genocidal intent, the court has said, can be inferred if it’s the only reasonable inference one can draw from the accused’s conduct—and the quantum of proof in these circumstances, the court has added, must be “fully conclusive.” Turning again to the Holocaust, think of the gas vans and mass firing squads the Nazis deployed—nearly 34,000 Jews lined up and murdered in two days at Babi Yar alone—and the gas chambers that exterminated millions more in death camps serviced by trains that delivered Jews from across Europe to death factories that operated around the clock. On the other hand, Allied bombing raids on German cities, carried out to achieve military objectives in a war against a brutal enemy, wouldn’t qualify as genocide—though they certainly attest to the fact that “war is hell.”
Proving a genocide, in short, is very hard—especially in the unique context of an urban war. As John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at West Point, has written, the average combatant-to-civilian kill ratio in the context of modern warfare is one to nine (one combatant for every nine civilians). Although that’s a staggering (and tragic) figure, no one seriously believes that every conflict in recent history has been a genocide. On the contrary, Myanmar is the first country the ICJ has ever found guilty of genocide. According to Spencer, the United States and our allies set the “standard” in Iraq and Afghanistan with a kill ratio of about one to three (or four). And many urban-warfare experts believed that no army would meet that standard again—until now. In arguably more difficult circumstances—with Hamas embedding its military infrastructure within and underneath the civilian population of Gaza—Israel has a kill ratio of about one to one (or two), slashing by more than 50 percent the standard we set in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Israel is guilty of genocide, in other words, then virtually every war in modern history has been a genocide.
This did not prevent South Africa from accusing Israel at the ICJ of committing genocide in its war against Hamas—a terrorist organization whose founding charter explicitly called for genocide against the Jews—which was armed, trained, and funded by the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country that expressly calls for wiping Israel and America off the map. The problem for South Africa was finding the evidence that fit the court’s well-established definition of genocide. As hundreds of military and international-law experts have written, Israel went to tremendous lengths—even at the risk of sacrificing its own soldiers—to protect the civilian population of Gaza. After the October 7, 2023, invasion, in which Palestinian militants killed 1,200 people, raped dozens of women, and took 251 hostages, Israel declared its twin war aims: to destroy Hamas’s capacity to threaten Israel and to return the hostages. Throughout the war, Israel’s war cabinet reiterated these legitimate and lawful war aims and repeatedly instructed its officers to follow international law by distinguishing between combatants and civilians.
And that admonition was heeded. As the High Level Military Group, a collection of officers and leaders from across the Western world, has written, Israel deployed what may be the most sophisticated and pervasive civilian-warning system the world has ever seen. And when it became clear that Hamas was forcing fleeing civilians to reenter the battlefield in order to increase the number of civilian casualties, Israel created humanitarian corridors, often guarded by Israeli soldiers, to allow Palestinian civilians to flee safely. Israel thus put its own soldiers in harm’s way to protect Palestinian civilians from other Palestinians. That’s the very opposite of genocide.
Which brings us back to the outsize interest in the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar. The overwhelming evidence that Israel has not committed genocide in Gaza has led some voices in the anti-Israel camp to grumble that the genocide case against Israel may be dead on arrival. Some believe that South Africa begged the ICJ for an 18-month extension of its next filing deadline—a request the court granted—precisely so that it might find, over the next few years, the evidence of genocide it has been sorely missing. Those hopes have now also dimmed, as Israel has compiled footage of dozens of strikes against legitimate military targets its pilots and commanders canceled because of a concern for civilian safety. This, again, is the very opposite of genocide. Did the German army employ a sophisticated, army-wide program to warn Jewish civilians to get out of the gas chambers? Did German firing squads hold their fire out of concern for civilian casualties? To ask these absurd questions is to answer them.
But what if the standard of genocide itself could be changed? Enter the Myanmar case. In December 2024, Ireland—one of the loudest expositors of the Gaza-genocide claim—joined, of all the cases in all the continents in all the world, The Gambia’s case against Myanmar. (It would join South Africa’s case against Israel a couple weeks later.) And Ireland (along with some others) quickly got to work asking the ICJ to relax the standard the court has traditionally applied to genocide cases with an eye to the case Ireland really cares about: the case against Israel. Its arguments didn’t come from nowhere: They were lifted from a report Amnesty International had published just two weeks before Ireland intervened against Myanmar, in which Amnesty—after leading with the headline that Israel was guilty of genocide—essentially conceded that the Gaza-genocide case was very likely unviable.
But Amnesty had a plan: The ICJ, it proposed, should change the definition of genocide to make it easier to find Israel guilty. In recent months, the chorus of countries and NGOs demanding this change has grown almost exponentially. Never mind that this would violate the animating principle of the Western tradition—which is that everyone is equal under the law, a principle that finds notable expression in the commonsense notion that a word (like genocide) must mean the same thing for the Jewish state as for everyone else.
Yesterday, the ICJ bowed to this pressure. In fact, it’s demolished each of the guardrails it had painstakingly erected over many decades to prevent the widespread misapplication of the Genocide Convention against states that are fighting legitimate wars of self-defense.
So the Internatiomnal Court of Justice has deliberately weakened the definition of genocide, with the clear aim of catching Israel in the net. We knew that, but it’s good to see it set out so clearly.
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