Mick Hartley

From part three of a series at the Daily NK – An in-depth look at Kim Jong Un’s “two states” narrative. This follows Kim Jong-un's recent declarations that talk of unification with Souh Korea is no longer possible, and that North and South Korea are now hostile states:

Much attention has been paid to Kim Jong Un’s denunciation of South Korea as the “primary foe and invariable principal enemy,” his definition of inter-Korean relations as “the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not [. . .] consanguineous or homogeneous ones,” and his orders for “preparations for a great event to suppress the whole territory of South Korea.”

But it should be remembered that this is a twofold tactic that, first of all, serves as “positional warfare” to give North Korea a pretext for bolstering its nuclear arsenal and increasing controls over its citizenry. Secondly, it is part of a “battle for the high ground” designed to pressure the U.S. and incite conflict in South Korea through psychological operations and a range of online and offline provocations.

Well yes. To those of us outside Korea this just seems like another step in the aggressive bombast of a desperate autocrat whose only tactic is to increase the fear factor, both for domestic consumption – how else to justify the enormous sums spent on nuclear weapons while the people starve? – and for international consumption, both in South Korea, and in Washington. Pay attention! You can't just ignore us! Unhappily for Pyongyang, the Yoon administration in Seoul is hard-line on North Korea, unlike the previous appeasement-minded Moon administration, while Biden has other things on his mind.

To sum up, Kim Jong Un has resorted to the desperate measure of threatening a “war between two states” that could go beyond limited skirmishes to all-out war while denying the doctrine of unification through a federation, which was the legacy of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. This reflects both Kim’s confidence in his ability to upgrade his nuclear weapon and missile forces, and his desire to frame the April general election in South Korea as a conflict between those who favor war and those who favor peace. But beyond that, Kim’s measures were likely motivated by the North Korean authorities’ fear and anxiety that the regime will soon implode unless it can fundamentally quash the “South Korea fever” that is so rampant among North Korean young people.

That's the key. The chances of Kim's rhetoric having much effect on South Korea's upcoming election are slim to non-existent. On the other hand the soft power of South Korean culture – now a world force in movies, TV, and music – is a very real threat to the North: hence the draconian measures, from years in labour camps up to and including execution, for anyone importing or even watching anything South Korean. All the Respected Commander can do is shout louder and up the threats.

So yes, it's a sign of desperation, but of course it's dangerous too – especially as China and Russia are both allies in this new cold war.