In the popular imagination, revolutions are made by brave crowds that storm palaces and fortresses, but that is an illusion. It is extremely hard for popular movements to overthrow tyrannies that command loyal and brutal security forces – as long as they are willing to use maximal violence.
There are fewer examples of that happening that one might expect. The Russian revolution in February 1917 is often cited as the classic case of a spontaneous uprising that brings down an autocrat; but the street protests in Petrograd were only a part of the story. The Tsar sent loyal troops to the city to crush the protests and that might have been achieved but before those troops arrived, he found himself isolated in a railway carriage and, after consulting his army, he was effectively deposed by his generals – a military coup in the shadow of popular protests.
The Iranian dictator commands between 90,000 and 300,000 Basij paramilitaries, around 150,000 Revolutionary Guards. Then there is the conventional army. If the security forces remain loyal and willing to kill to maintain their position, it is incredibly hard to overthrow any regime.
The real coup de grace is almost always delivered within the palace, not the streets. The streets exert the pressure but the courtiers wield the dagger.
If the Revolutionary Guards commanders may be totally committed to the regime, what about the generals of the regular army? What if a Caesaresque Bonapartist leader emerged from the military?
It has happened before in Iran. That was how Reza Shah rose to the throne.
Mick Hartley 
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