Mick Hartley

Iran is down but not out, while Turkey and Sunni Islam are resurgent. Much of these developments are thanks to Israeli campaigns – notably the remarkable success of their effective destruction of Hezbollah as a force in the region. What prospects, then for the year ahead? Jonathan Spyer in the JC:

With the inauguration of a new US president Israel is likely to seek support for an invigorated campaign against Iran, with the ultimate objective now being the bringing down of the Iranian regime. There is in the Israeli political and security establishment a growing conviction that the Iranian regime is currently both more vulnerable than ever before, yet potentially more dangerous.

Its vulnerability comes from the blows inflicted on it in the second half of 2024. The danger is that with its proxy strategy severely set back, Iran may turn toward other elements of power projection. The ballistic missile programme and the nuclear project are the other two components. There appears to be a widespread view in Israeli leadership circles that the new incumbent in the White House will be in agreement regarding the need for a new, forward strategy against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Whether or not that is true is likely to become apparent in the course of 2025.

It is also important to bear in mind that the main effect of diminishing Iranian power in the region over the last year, in addition to a renewed respect for and awareness of Israeli capacities and power, is the advance of Turkey. HTS’s victory in Syria was a result of the strategic acumen and Islamist commitment of Turkish President Recep Tayepp Erdogan. Ankara’s domiciling of the Syrian rebels in the northwest of the country made possible the HTS offensive.

In the year ahead, Turkey will seek to consolidate its control of Syria by entrenching HTS and Sunni Islamist control and crushing alternative centres of power in the country. The Turkish/HTS taking of Damascus is likely to lead to a resurgence of Sunni political Islam in the region. This may also lead to conflict with Shia elements, for example in the framework of the continued Shia domination of Lebanon and Iraq. Many former officials of the Assad regime have made their way to Lebanon. It is likely that they may seek to foment unrest among non-Sunni supporters of the former regime against the new rulers.

But any notion that the revival of the fortunes of Sunni Islamism represents a net gain for the West and its allies should be dismissed.

The advance of Turkey and its clients raises an alternative banner for political Islam in the region, one with in many ways greater capacity and sophistication than Iran.

It introduces a third focus of power, in addition to the Iran-led bloc, and the loose alliance of US-aligned states centred on Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

2025 will see competition between these three blocs, with the stance of the US, and the extent of its involvement, perhaps the key element that will determine the course of events. Buckle up – the ride is far from over.

As regards the new Syrian rulers – the new acceptable face of Jihad with the turbans and blood-chilling rhetoric abandoned from the old Al-Qaeda/IS days – they're making all the right noises to reassure the international community, but of course it's inevitable that suspicions remain. The 2015 video of the new Syrian Justice Minister Shadi Al-Waisi overseeing the execution of a woman for adultery is absolutely chilling (this MEMRI clip thankfully stops before the actual gunshot to the back of the head), however much he may claim that this stuff is now all behind him.

And what of the Syrian Kurds? Erdogan wants them destroyed, but they've always been allies to Israel and the West. Could they be the spark that sets off a war between Turkey and Israel?