What can the people of North Korea expect from their new Supreme Commander? A number of commentators have suggested that he may go down the Chinese road and set about introducing reforms. On the other hand:
Unexpectedly harsh crackdowns and extreme treatment of defection cases since the death of Kim Jong Il are leading to fears that life will be even more repressive under Kim Jong Eun in 2012 than it was under his father.
Before the North Korean authorities announced the death of Kim, border security staff were given new orders to ‘eliminate’ suspected defectors and their families. Barricades have been set three or four deep in parts of border areas to keep people from escaping, while movement is being restricted in other cities as well by the People’s Safety Agency, the army and recently formed 'riot squads'.
According to internal sources, the National Security Agency (NSA) has told local People’s Units to pass on the fact that defection will be met with unconditional punishment for three generations of the family.
Travel to border areas has been stopped for anyone not actually living there. Any travel, even for personal reasons, is banned, with the authorities simply refusing to issue travel passes to border towns. People in those towns have reportedly been told that they risk being shot if they are on the streets without just cause.
A broker from Changbai, China who helps defectors escape from North Korea told Daily NK that it has become extremely difficult to get out of the country at all, saying, “Most people wouldn’t even dream of it now.” Naturally, the increased security controls at the border have doubled the price of crossing the river.
Orders have been handed down to shoot anyone trying to escape via the East or West Seas, too. When an unauthorized boat leaves port, the coastguard issues a warning before giving chase. However, during the mourning period, orders were to treat any unauthorized ship leaving the shore as an attempted defection and to shoot on sight.
Even if the young Kim's personal inclination was to go down the path of reform – which I very much doubt – the logic of his current position dictates that his only choice at present is more, and worse, of the same. He may be Supreme Commander, but his figurehead authority rests on a behind-the-scenes power structure whose interests are firmly fixed on maintaining the status quo. And the manner of his rise to power – not through any particular personal qualities, but solely through an accident of birth – would very much suggest that a radical policy shift led from above, in the style of Deng Xiaoping after Mao, is not something we're likely to see.
The Korean spring? On indefinite hold…
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