Mick Hartley

Some more sensible pieces coming out now, after the initial barrage of Blair-hate. Gary Kent – Reflections on Chilcot:

We need a serious debate about Chilcot. It concludes that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not the last resort and diplomacy needed more time to work. That is a reasonable judgement but can be contested. The lawyer Philip Bobbitt challenges it profoundly. He writes in the Financial Times that Saddam’s rearmament not disarmament was the issue and that, ‘If you accept, or even entertain the notion, that the strategic purpose behind the 2003 invasion of Iraq was to prevent a wealthy, monomaniacal dictator from acquiring an arsenal to pursue objectives he had clearly announced to the world — thus deterring outside forces from preventing him from achieving those objectives – then some of the most dramatic assertions of the report will seem to miss the point.’

The passage of time has also wrenched the decisions of Bush and Blair out of context. The saga began in August 1990 with Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Arguably, it should have begun with Saddam using WMD in a genocide against the Kurds in the late 1980s. How to contain or overthrow Saddam was a constant concern of the West from 1991 as the UN sanctions regime was eroded while Saddam defied a series of UN resolutions

The threat became more urgent after 9/11. But 9/11 had nothing to do with Saddam? Correct, but Bush and Blair could not take it for granted that Saddam would not ally with and arm jihadists, as his followers did after the fall of his regime.

Saddam’s small movements to accept UN demands were only the result of 250,000 soldiers massed on his borders. They could only stay there for a limited time due to cost and heat. If such a force had been withdrawn, could it have been reassembled? How likely was it that the no-fly zone over the safe haven of much of the Kurdistan Region would be maintained?

The danger of Saddam surviving, or handing over power to his psychopathic sons, and then resuming genocide against the Kurds weighed most heavily in my mind and I join the Kurds in arguing that the invasion was a liberation.

War could have been avoided if Saddam had moved more. But those who believe it was unstoppable in any case are finding comfort in a previously secret memo from Blair to Bush in July 2002 which began ‘I will be with you, whatever.’ It is taken to mean Blair promised to send British forces into action with the Americans by bamboozling the Cabinet, parliament and people.

It was, instead, an effort to express solidarity with the US after 9/11 and to influence America as it raged against those who had carried out mass murder and who would do so again in even larger numbers if possible. Blair conceded he couldn’t be sure of support from Parliament, Party, public or even some of the Cabinet and highlights the importance of the Middle East Peace Process. It assumes that Saddam had WMD.

Ah, those WMD. It is not a killer fact that they were not discovered… The now Iraqi Prime Minister…told me in 2009 in Baghdad that he thought they had been taken to Syria. UN resolutions required Saddam to demonstrate WMD did not exist and he acted as if they did. The lie may well have been that they didn’t but it was Saddam’s deceit. Intelligence about a society where dissent and disclosure were capital offences was inevitably difficult.

Chilcot also cites the MI5 warning that action would increase Al Qaeda attacks. But if action was the right judgement, a Prime Minister who buckled under such a threat would have been condemned for cowardice.

Chilcot is not the Oracle but its judgements on those judgements deserve the calmest consideration if we are to uphold the principles of liberal intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. The danger is Chilcot chills necessary intervention….