Mick Hartley

Further to this post yesterday, here's some more North Korean commentary (via The Marmot). From the WSJ, Let the Kim Regime Collapse:

Soon after President Barack Obama's inauguration in January, North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il welcomed him in typical fashion by testing another nuclear weapon. Mr. Obama reacted firmly by suspending the six-party disarmament talks and imposing tough sanctions. But a year later the Obama administration is poised to begin the talks anew.

That would be a mistake. As American diplomats coax North Korea to return to the negotiating table, a far more significant drama is unfolding: serious instability within the hermit kingdom. This time the Kim regime may really fall, and the Obama administration would be wise to get out of its way.

Kim appears to have finally crossed a line with his own people when he let his son and chosen successor, Kim Jong Un, announce a currency revaluation last month. The Kims were threatened by the growth of a small, independent merchant class and decided to destroy it through a surprise currency revaluation. As many North Koreans lost what little wealth they had and the Kims all but destroyed the small private sector, the public responded angrily. There have been reports of protests and riots, with many North Koreans publicly burning their newly worthless currency—a rare sign of political dissent for North Korea's long-suffering populace….

With protests that forced a policy change, a sanctions regime that has so far deprived Kim of at least $18 million, and uncertainty about the Dear Leader's succession plan, it may well be that this time around Kim is truly running out of money and possibly control.

Rather than bail him out, Washington should let Kim fall. It's the best chance the U.S. has of achieving its twofold objectives: denuclearization in North Korea and the eventual unification of the peninsula. After all, the Kim clique has made it clear after decades of negotiations that no amount of aid will suffice to induce them to end their nuclear program. The relatively conciliatory response to Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth's mission earlier this month—the North Koreans declared that "differences" have been "narrowed"—was a classic North Korean negotiating ploy, not an eleventh-hour acceptance of a nuclear-free world.

And the same message – leave them alone – comes from South Korea's Chosun Ilbo:

Some people have started to call on the Lee Myung-bak administration to moderate its hardline policy toward North Korea. They feel the South should soften its position in tune with the moderating atmosphere whereby the United States has drawn Pyongyang into dialogue. The president himself also hinted at changes in his North Korea policy by referring to an inter-Korean summit.

But this is not the right time to talk about any shifts one way or the other. What is needed is careful observation of the changes in North Korea, particularly because Pyongyang faces a serious economic crisis and public support for the regime looks very shaky….

It's expected that the North will suffer a crisis next year more serious than its 1997-98 famine. If the grassroots market is disrupted while this happens, experts say, the North would suffer large-scale starvation in the lean season next year. In addition, North Koreans are not what they used to be a decade ago. They apparently watch South Korea dramas and are well aware what South Koreans' life is like.  "The currency reform has perhaps touched the detonator of the grassroots economy," said a North Korean defector.

Some appeasers point to North Korea's imminent return to the six-party talks. But that only means turning back the clock to an endless meaningless round of agreements and backtracking that achieve no palpable results. The regime seems to realize that it is hitting a cul-de-sac. In working for a breakthrough with the U.S. at a time when U.S. President Barack Obama faces pressure to produce results in the North Korean issue, Kim also needs support from the south Korean president.

In the circumstances, North Korea's nuclear arms and the people's rights are in danger of being forgotten. It looks as though the North's return to the six-party talks, bilateral talks with the U.S., a peace treaty and moderation are becoming ends in themselves. There is no explaining the irony that the U.S., China and even South Korea seem inclined to help the North Korean regime at the very time when it is facing its biggest crisis.