Mick Hartley

It seems to have been generally assumed that the recent US intelligence report – the one that reckoned Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons programme back in 2003 – was something of a blow for the White House and a triumph for Iran. That’s certainly the way Ahmadinejad and co have presented it. This report suggests a different story:

A rift is emerging between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran’s supreme religious leader, suggesting that the president no longer enjoys Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s full backing.

The move will see Ahmadinejad’s grip on power weakened ahead of parliamentary elections in March.

In the years after his election in 2005, criticism from political opponents was usually silenced by Khamenei, who has the final word on state matters and regularly endorsed the president in public speeches. But that support has been conspicuously absent in recent months.

There are numerous possible reasons for Ahmadinejad’s loss of support, but diplomats and analysts in Iran all point to one overriding factor: the US. An American intelligence report last month said Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 in response to international pressure. The report sharply reduced the threat of a military strike against Iran, allowing the Iranian authorities to focus on domestic issues, with important parliamentary elections looming in March.

“Now that Iran is not under the threat of a military attack, all contradictions within the establishment are surfacing,” said Saeed Leylaz, an economic and political analyst. “The biggest mistake that Americans have constantly made toward Iran was adopting radical approaches which provided the ground for radicals in the country to take control.”

Iran had been under increasing international pressure for its refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, which can be pursued for either peaceful or military purposes. In separate speeches last year, American and French officials did not rule out a military attack on Iran if it continued its defiance.

While the pressure was on, Iranian leaders were reluctant to let any internal disagreements show. Senior officials, including Khamenei, constantly called for unity and warned that the enemy, a term commonly used to refer to the Untied States, could take advantage of such differences.

The Iranian presidency is a largely ceremonial post. But Ahmadinejad had used the office to espouse an economic populism that built a strong following among the country’s middle and lower classes and made him a political force to be reckoned with. That popularity won him the strong backing of the supreme leader.

But the relationship began to sour, even before the US intelligence report was released. A source close to Khamenei said the ayatollah was especially disappointed with Ahmadinejad’s economic performance, which has led to steep inflation in the cost of basic necessities, from food to rents to property values.

“Mr Khamenei supported Mr Ahmadinejad because he believed in his slogans of helping the poor,” said the source. “But his economic performance has been disastrous. Their honeymoon is certainly over.”

Did US intelligence foresee all this? Is it the kind of outcome they were looking for? Given the general competence of intelligence agencies that may be a trifle optimistic, but you never know.